|Posted by xxn « , Jul 16,1999,07:53||Forum|
EDITOR's note: Xinhua News Agency yesterday released a report by the Information Office of the State Council. Titled
"Facts Speak Louder Than Words and Lies Will Collapse by Themselves," the report concludes that the Cox report is a
work of fabrication.
Following is full text of the State Council report.
On May 31, the head of the Information Office of the State Council made a speech on the US National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Cox report) released
by the Select Committee of the US House of Representatives. He stated that the Cox report was a farce that aimed to
instigate anti-China sentiments and undermine Sino-US relations. In order to clarify the truth and expose the facts, the
Information Office of the State Council has
conducted further investigations of the issues raised in the report. Voluminous facts indicate that the essence of this report
is to fan anti-China feelings and undermine Sino-US relations. To achieve this political purpose, the report leaves no
stone unturned to distort facts, substitute one thing for another, make subjective assumptions and groundless accusations
and resort to demagoguery. The conclusions of the report, therefore, are utterly absurd and do not hold water.
Moreover, it is even contrary to
the general knowledge of basic science and technology. The release of the report has not only aroused the strong
indignation of the Chinese people, but also invited severe criticism from personages with breadth of vision in the
international community, including the United States.
I. Sensational lies
The Cox report inflammatorily accuses China of "stealing" secret information on the most advanced thermonuclear
warheads possessed by the United States, including the seven types of W-88, W-87, W-78, W-76, W-70, W-62 and
W-56. It claims: "In the late 1970s, the PRC stole design information on the US W-70 warhead (enhanced radiation
nuclear warhead, also known as the neutron bomb) from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. The PRC subsequently
tested a neutron bomb in 1988." This is a groundless, vicious calumny
of the Chinese people and Chinese scientists.
Since the 1950s, as everybody knows, China has successfully overcome a series of difficult technological problems and
mastered the nuclear weapon technology within a reasonably short time by relying on its own forces, on its large number
of talented scientists full of creative spirit and on the energetic support of the people throughout the country. On October
16, 1964, China successfully conducted its first atom bomb test. On December 28, 1966, it mastered the principle of
hydrogen (H) bomb technology and
on June 17, 1967, it successfully carried out its first H-bomb test. During this period, China also conducted missile
nuclear weapon tests, initially forming its own nuclear self-defence and counter-attack strength. In the 1970s and 1980s,
China faced an ever-intensifying nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and tens of
thousands of nuclear warheads, which, like dark clouds, hung over the heads of all people in the world and directly
threatened China's safety. China had no other
choice but to continue to research and develop nuclear weapons technology and improve its nuclear weapons systems,
mastering in succession the neutron bomb design technology and the nuclear weapon miniaturization technology.
The neutron bomb seems quite mysterious to ordinary people. In fact, it is a special kind of H-bomb. Because China has
already possessed atom bomb and H-bomb technologies, it is quite logical and natural for it to master neutron bomb
technology through its own efforts over a reasonable period of time.
The structure, size, weight, shape, power and circular error probability, as well as the service time, of seven US nuclear
warheads, including the W-88, listed in the Cox report, in fact, can be found in many open documents and on the
Internet. They are not at all secret. On the Internet alone, more than 100 articles about the principle and structure of the
neutron bomb were found. Those with general scientific* knowledge understand that nuclear weapons cannot be
developed simply by relying on such data.
In a recent interview with The Washington Post, Harold M. Agnew, US nuclear weapons expert and former head of the
Los Alamos National Laboratory of the United States, and Johnny S. Foster, former head of the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, said: "Even data on the size, weight, shape and yield, although highly classified, does not represent
a warhead's design in any real sense."
Foster also said: "We showed them what is possible and they probably learned that some time ago when the size and
shape of the re-entry vehicle and its explosive yield were first made public." Because this data is not included in nuclear
weapon design secrets, the Cox report's accusation that China used "stolen" information to develop its own nuclear
weapons is an out-and-out lie and a clumsy swindle.
The Cox report bolsters its "guesses" that China must have "stolen" American technological secrets by asserting that the
United States has conducted more than 1,000 nuclear tests, but China mastered advanced warhead technology by
conducting only 45 tests. This suffices to show that Cox and others have underestimated the creativity of the Chinese
people and Chinese scientists. Even today, they still cling to this manifestation of racial discrimination.
The Cox report subjectively surmises: "The PRC would, therefore, be especially interested in acquiring US
thermonuclear weapons codes for any new weapons based on elements of stolen US design information."
It continues: "The PRC has in fact acquired some US computer codes, including: the MCNPT code, the DOT3.5 code,
and the NJOYC code."
In fact, the three codes are standard ones extensively used worldwide for decades in nuclear reactor engineering design,
nuclear reactor radiation shielding safety analysis and other fields of nuclear energy research. They are widely applied by
many research institutes, universities and atomic energy engineering research and design institutes of IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency) member countries. They have nothing to do with the design of thermonuclear warhead.
In order to promote the development of China's nuclear power construction, in the early 1980s, China acquired gratis
from the IAEA the DOT3.5 code for calculating nuclear reactor safety. In the middle and latter half of the 1980s, it
acquired the MCNPT code for tackling the same problem and the NJOYC code for nuclear data research. Over many
years, Chinese scientists have consistently and punctually fed back the problems found in the course of utilization and the
results of calculation to the IAEA and vario
us programming units. Obviously, Chinese scientists have made their own contributions to the improvement of the
functions of these computer codes. As a responsible member of the IAEA over a long period, China has organized
dozens of domestic universities and scientific research institutes to participate in this international co-operative research.
The research results and computer software developed by Chinese scientists have been provided frequently to the IAEA
to be shared by its member countries. The Cox
report, denying China's positive contributions to the global peaceful utilization of atomic energy, slanders China for
"illegally" acquiring computer software codes to develop its own nuclear weapons. This only exposes an ignorance of
general scientific and technical knowledge.
The Cox report also alleges China "stole" the secrets of the nuclear explosion tests of miniature fusion and the
anti-submarine microwave technology. This is sheer nonsense. People with even slight scientific and technical knowledge
know that, as early as 1964, when China successfully exploded its first atom bomb, Wang Ganchang, noted Chinese
physicist and academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), initially advanced the concept of laser-based
nuclear fusion. He is considered one of the earliest
scientists in the world who independently put forward the concept. Following this, China began its systematic research
on the technology of laser-based nuclear fusion. In 1973, the one-beam laser was used to drive deuteron ice and a
neutron was observed in the experiment. In 1974, a nuclear reaction took place through the use of one-beam laser on a
drive target of deuteron polymer, and a D-D reaction to produce a neutron was observed. In 1986, China adopted the
direct driving method to produce a neutron from
a glass target capsule filled with D-T gas. Between 1990-92, through experimentation, thermonuclear fusion reaction
was achieved through the method of indirect driving, and a thermonuclear neutron was observed. In the mid-1970s,
renowned Chinese theoretical physicist, CAS academician Yu Min and a batch of Chinese scientists under his leadership
advanced the concept of achieving laser fusion through the method of the X-ray radiation for driving a shooting laser into
a heavy metal shelled cavity through the
entrance, and put forward the structural design of placing target pellets at the centre of the columnar hollow cavity.
Between the late 1970s and the 1980s, China manufactured its own laser device _ Shen Guang (magical light) _ for
research into laser-based nuclear fusion. Later, it was discovered through US declassified documents that Chinese and
US scientists almost simultaneously advanced a similar concept in their respective research. This fully indicates that the
law governing science exists objectively,
and people all over the world can access it sooner or later, no matter what method is used. If Cox and others had
seriously consulted experts for scientific* knowledge, they would not have made such a silly mistake that only reveals their
lack of general scientific*knowledge.
With the ever-increasing global economic, scientific and technological exchanges and international co-operation, China
has made much headway in its economic, scientific and technological exchanges and co-operation with various countries.
Against this major background, Chinese and US nuclear scientists have developed normal academic exchanges in many
fields. At the invitation of the US side, Chinese research institutes and US national laboratories began exchanges and
co-operation in the 1990s, with the scope
of co-operation ranging from nuclear proliferation prevention to arms control and environmental protection. In July 1998,
the two sides jointly held the Integrated Demonstration of Material Protection, Control and Accountability in Beijing. The
publicity materials distributed by the US side at the demonstration meeting pointed out that, between the 1980s and the
early 1990s, the laboratories of the US Department of Energy (DOE), after contacts with related Chinese research
institutes, believed the two countries
had many mutual interests and that advances in technical exchanges in these fields could contribute to a greater
understanding and trust between the two countries.
Cox and others, however, brazenly started the rumour: "PRC scientists have used their extensive
laboratory-to-laboratory interactions with the United States to gain information from US scientists on common problems,
solutions to nuclear weapons physics and solutions to engineering problems."
A further fabrication declared: "US scientists have passed information to the PRC in this way that is of benefit to the
PRC's nuclear weapons programme."
In fact, the lab-to-lab exchange programme was approved by the governments of the two countries and the fields
involved were strictly limited to the scope of nuclear proliferation prevention, arms control and environmental issues.
Scientists and officials of the two countries participating in the lab-to-lab exchange programme were all very serious and
highly responsible. They were very clear of where their own country's security interests lay, and the responsibility they
assumed for it. They would never have
touched upon their own countries' nuclear weapon secrets on such occasion. Some US anti-China politicians'
gratuitous accusation of the Sino-US lab-to-lab exchange programme not only sully the dignity of Chinese scientists, but
also damage the dignity of US scientists.
What deserves special mention is that US national laboratories exercised very strict secret protection and
counter-intelligence policies on the visiting scholars carrying out the lab-to-lab exchange programme.
Dr John C. Browne, head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, said at a hearing of the US Congress Select
Committee on the Sino-US lab-to-lab exchange programme: "All foreign visits and assignments at the laboratory are
governed by DOE requirements. From these requirements, the lab develops the protection methodology and
procedures. Our methodology uses a multi-layer protection approach consisting of combinations of administrative and
Visiting scholars were not allowed to enter secure areas and could only enter non-secure areas for work in the company
of personages from the US side. Visiting scholars were not permitted to use secret computer networks. It should be
pointed out that all Chinese visiting scholars strictly adhered to the US side's secret protection requirements. The Cox
report cannot even cite a single violation of the secret protection requirements by any person from the Chinese side
working in US nuclear weapon laboratories.
This shows it was impossible for Chinese visiting scholars to acquire the so-called "nuclear weapon secret
information." As for US scientists and administrative personages who came to China under the lab-to-lab exchange
programme, the US side also had strict management policies. At the same hearing, Dr Browne testified: "Our policy is to
provide 100 per cent of our travellers to the PRC with a counter-intelligence threat awareness briefing including the latest
information regarding the country as possibl
e. Upon return, 100 per cent of our travellers are debriefed regarding their activities in the PRC with the information
provided to all appropriate government agencies. We have also instituted a policy that requires more than one US
traveller per trip to reduce opportunities for entrapment." In fact, the US management over delegations to China was
stricter than what Dr Browne stated. The delegations' academic theses must have been subjected to strict examination.
Before the end of each visit, the visiting
delegations had to go to the US Embassy in China to report on their activities in the country. The hotels where delegation
members stayed were decided, in principle, by the US side at home. During their visits to China, delegation members
While cooking up the lie that China "stole" the US' most advanced nuclear weapon design secrets and developed its own
nuclear weapons of a new generation on this basis, Cox and others said alarmingly: "A modernized PRC strategic
nuclear ballistic missile force would pose a credible direct threat against the United States."
As everybody knows, the Chinese Government has consistently proposed the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons. China, as a developing country, needs a peaceful international environment so that it can
concentrate its efforts on economic development. Over the past few decades, the Chinese Government and people have
always stood in the forefront of the struggle for complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, facing the direct
threat of hegemonism to China's national security
and State sovereignty, and under the circumstance that nuclear blackmail and nuclear monopoly still exists in the world,
the Chinese people have no other choice except to conduct self-defence. It was under the circumstances of the nuclear
threat and nuclear blackmail posed by the superpowers that China was forced to carry out the research and
development of nuclear weapons.
China is a peace-loving country. When China successfully exploded its first atom bomb on October 16, 1964, the
Chinese Government solemnly declared to the world that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any
time and under any circumstances. This stand has remained unchanged. The nuclear weapons that China was forced to
develop are quite limited in power and are solely for the purpose of self-defence. Never did they in the past, nor do they
at present or will they in the future pose any t
hreat to peace-loving countries and peoples.
II. Fabrication that lacks basic knowledge of science and technology
The Cox report deliberately distorts the development history of China's space undertakings, alleging that China
"acquired" the technological know-how from the United States, which helped its missile and space programmes. In fact,
China's space sector has independently accomplished development from scratch to the world's most advanced level by
totally relying on its own scientific forces. Under the circumstances of an all-round blockade and embargo imposed by
the United States and other Western countries, China
successfully developed intermediate and short-range missiles in 1964, and succeeded in launching its first man-made
earth satellite in 1970 and a recoverable satellite in 1975. There were further developments between the late 1970s and
the early 1980s. For example, China successfully launched a long-range rocket into the Pacific Ocean in 1980, and a
solid-propellant rocket from a submarine in 1982, and further inserted a communications satellite into a geostationary
orbit in 1984. These achievements had
all been made before China entered the international commercial satellite launching market, and, again, were
accomplished without any foreign assistance.
The Cox report says: "The PRC first began developing its own communications satellites in the early 1970s, based on
Western technology." The fact is that, on the founding of New China, the United States and Western countries began
imposing an all-round blockade and embargo against the country. The Paris-based Co-ordinating Committee for Export
Control was then established to restrict high-tech exports to China. Against this historical background, how could China
rely on the United States and other Western
countries to develop its satellite technology? The report asserts that China used every means to "steal" US satellite
technology. This is an absurd supposition. As everyone knows, China began launching US-made satellites in 1990.
However, China has since 1970 successfully launched more than 40 various domestic satellites. China has mature
technologies to design and produce different types of orbital vehicles, such as scientific experimentation satellites,
recoverable satellites, geostationary orbit communications
satellites and meteorological and earth resources satellites. The Cox report also claims that the control processor on
the Dongfanghong-III Satellite, developed independently by the Chinese Academy of Space Technology, was produced
by the American company Matra Marconi Space. Obviously, this is not an error resulting from the carelessness of those
who produced the report.
The Cox report also mentions the return of Chinese scientist Qian Xuesen to the motherland and takes this as an
example to falsely claim China's missile technology was "stolen" from the United States. Chinese scientists have
expressed great indignation over this. In 1935, Qian Xuesen went to study in the United States as a Tsinghua University
student at the public's expense. He then stayed on and worked there. After the People's Republic of China was founded
in 1949, the young, promising Qian, who possesses
high national pride, confidence and integrity, yearned to return to the motherland. At that time, however, McCarthyism
prevailed in the United States. The US Government persecuted him under the pretext of various "unwarranted" charges.
Through representations made by the Chinese Government on many occasions, Qian finally returned to the motherland in
1955. Restricted by the US Government, he did not bring back with him any research materials, and he even left behind
some of his personal articles. The Cox
report alleges that, since Qian Xuesen had been working on the US Titan intercontinental missile programme, he illegally
brought the US missile technology and related information back with him to China. This is pure fiction. According to the
Early Development in Nuclear Force Guidance compiled by the FAS, the US Titan missile programme was determined
in October 1953 based on the suggestion of the US Air Force Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee (later called the
VON NEUMAN Committee), but related government
departments only formally signed contracts for development in 1955. Prior to this, in July 1950, the security
clearances qualifying Qian Xuesen to participate in secret research were cancelled by the US Government and he was
detained. Although he was later released on parole, he was subject to restrictions by the US Immigration Service and
supervision by the Federal Bureau of Investigation until he left the United States in 1955. Cox and others seemed to be
meticulous in writing this lengthy report. But,
they even failed to clarify the sequence of events. This, perhaps, is not merely negligence.
In 1985, China entered the international commercial launching market, which by its nature represents an aspect of the
peaceful use of space technology and a normal international service trade. However, the Cox report asserts that China
"stole" or "illegally acquired" US missile technology through commercial launches to promote its own missile capability.
This is not only contrary to the facts, but it also lacks basic knowledge of science and technology.
People with even slight scientific* knowledge will know that a carrier rocket is developed on the basis of ballistic missiles.
The carrier rocket and missile have different requirements in terms of guidance precision. The guidance of a rocket is
primarily for controlling the orbital injection precision of a satellite, while a missile's guidance system is to control the
deviation during its three major phases of flight _ the powered and unpowered flight phases and the re-entry phase _ so
as to ultimately achieve
pinpoint accuracy in delivering the warhead on the selected target. Obviously, a missile requires greater precision in
the guidance system than a carrier rocket. The greater the precision of a commercial satellite launch, the higher the cost.
Generally, out of consideration of economic rationality, commercial launches do not require excessively high guidance
technology. How can one use the rocket guidance technology for improving the guidance precision of missiles?
The Cox report also says that the US carrier rocket fairing technique China has acquired through commercial satellite
launches "may assist the design and improved reliability of future PRC MIRVed missiles, if the PRC decides to develop
them, and of future submarine-launched ballistic missiles." In fact, China has mature experience in fairing design. Prior to
1992, China had already developed two kinds of fairing, and succeeded in many launches under wind aloft conditions in
winter season. The fairing of the
LM-2E China uses in commercial launches was designed and produced on the basis of 10 successful flights of that used
for the Long March rocket series. China needs not acquire US fairing technology through commercial launching services,
but has relied on its own strength to accomplish all improvements and developments.
What deserves special mention is that a distinct difference exists between the design technology of the fairing on a carrier
rocket and that of a multiple-warhead missile. The fairing of a multi-warhead missile requires an all-weather,
omni-bearing operating environment; hence, an integrated design is generally adopted. For carrier rockets, however, the
technique of lateral separation design is normally used. Therefore, it is out of the question to make use of the rocket's
fairing design technique for improving
that of a multiple-warhead missile.
The Cox report says China "acquired" the smart dispenser technique through iridium satellite launches and has used it in
its MIRV (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle) dispensing technology. In fact, before launching an iridium
satellite, China had succeeded many times in launching multiple satellites atop a single rocket. In July 1990, China
succeeded in its first launch of a dual payload atop a LM-2C rocket, including a Pakistani satellite. The two satellites
were placed respectively in LEO
(low earth orbit) and geostationary transfer orbit. In September 1990, China used a LM-4 to successfully place three
satellites into solar stationary orbit. In October 1992, the LM-2C rocket carried a Sweden FREJA satellite and a
Chinese recoverable satellite into the space, inserting them into two different LEO. In February 1994, a LM-3A was
launched with Experiment-4 satellite and a dummy payload. This fact indicates that China has already mastered, and has
been continuously improving, its dispenser design
technique. There is no key technology hard to master, let alone any need to make use of iridium satellite launches for
improving China's MIRV technique.
The Cox report spends two chapters on detailing the investigative process and making a fuss about the Apstar-2 satellite
launch failure by a LM-2E on January 26, 1995 and the Intelsat-708 satellite launch failure by a LM-3B on February
15, 1996. The report concludes that China "stole" or "illegally acquired" US space technology through the failure
investigation. It says, "US satellite manufacturers transferred missile design information and know-how to the PRC
without obtaining the legally required licenses
. This information has improved the reliability of PRC rockets useful for civilian and military purposes. The illegally
transmitted information is useful for the design and improved reliability of future PRC ballistic missiles as well." Facts
prove this conclusion is ill-founded.
The Cox report claims that during the failure investigation, US satellite manufacturers provided China with a "diagnostic
programme" for failure analysis and "transferred missile design information and know-how." The fact is, with more than
40 years of independent development of rockets and missiles, China has possessed a complete set of reliability design
methods and failure diagnosis treatment regulations, as well as a strict quality guarantee system. The more than 100
flights undertaken are sufficient to
ensure that China develops and manufactures reliable high-quality missiles and carrier rockets and acquires the full ability
to tackle difficult problems in the launching process and remove failures. Compared with the US expendable carrier
rockets of the same category, the reliability of China's carrier rockets is by no means inferior (see table 1). Prior to the
Chinese and US companies' joint analysis of the Apstar-2 satellite launch failure by a LM-2E in 1995, China's LM-2C
rocket had recorded 14 success
ful launches in succession. Thereafter, it launched an iridium satellite of the Motorola Co into space six straight times
without a hitch. The US Titan-4 rocket, however, suffered three successive failures on August 2, 1998 and on April 9
and 30, 1999. This speaks for itself.
Shortly after the Apstar-2 launch failure by a LM-2E on January 26, 1995, the Chinese side immediately set up a failure
investigation leading group and a failure investigation committee. The committee had under it six failure analysis groups
for rocket debris analysis, fairing analysis, dynamics coupling analysis, video-tape analysis and telemetry date analysis.
They made in-depth and careful studies and analyses on several important parts, including the structure of the fairing, and
questioned the method f
or satellite-launch vehicle coupling. The US side also made an analysis of the causes leading to the launch vehicle and
satellite failure. In a joint announcement issued in Beijing on July 23, 1995, the China Great Wall Industry Corp and the
US Hughes Space and Communications International Incorpation concluded that there were two possible causes:
(1) Under the shear wind aloft conditions in the winter season, the resonance exerted due to the unique interface of the
satellite and the upper stage with the launch vehicle caused local structural damage to the satellite.
(2) Under the shear wind aloft conditions in the winter season, the fairing of the launch vehicle suffered local structural
The Chinese side accepted the first cause, holding that it is the resonance of the satellite and the upper stage with the
launch vehicle that caused the failure, while Hughes Inc opted for the second cause, believing that the failure resulted
from insufficient strength of the fairing. The two sides failed to reach a compromising conclusion. It is normal for either
side to announce its analysis results to support its viewpoint, and this has nothing to do with the question of one side
giving away techniques t
o the other. The Chinese side firmly believes it has mature experience in fairing design, and the fairing of the LM-2E was
designed and manufactured on the basis of 10 successful flights of Long March rockets that were installed with the same
type. Actually, the fairing China still uses on the LM-2C and LM-3 rockets belongs to the same category as that used on
Apstar-2 satellite. No reinforcement measures have been adopted, and the ensuing launches have all been successful.
The LM-2C/SD rocket, which succes
sfully launched two iridium satellites on June 12, 1999, also used a product of the same category.
The Cox report claims that China "illegally acquired" the satellite mechanical model technique from the United States
through the failure investigation. This is also contrary to the facts. In order to work on the coupled loads computation of
the launch vehicle and satellite, the latter's manufacturers must provide a satellite mechanical model. This is used to shrink
the satellite structure, through mathematical means, into a group of data of equal mechanical value. During the early
period of rocket developm
ent, China had established a rocket mechanical model and had determined various external forces (such as engine thrust
and aerodynamics) during the process of flight. Strength and Environment, a professional Chinese publication in 1980,
carried special introductions for this model shrinking method, which, after 1984, was included in the Structure Vibration
and Dynamic Substructure Analysis Method, a textbook compiled by Shanghai's Fudan University. This is also an
effective method, universally employed worl
dwide, to describe the satellite structure. The former Soviet Union and the United States also openly published articles
about this method. Once the satellite structure, shrunk through this method, is connected with the rocket model, coupled
loads computation can then be conducted. The method to calculate the coupled loads of satellite and the launch vehicle
that is commonly used in international commercial launching services can help satellite manufacturers keep the satellite's
technical secrets because th
e mechanical model can by no means restore the real structure of the satellite.
As to the investigation into the failed launch of the Intelsat-708 on February 15, 1996, the Cox report claims that it was
under the direction of US experts of the Independent Review Committee (IRC) that the Chinese found the key cause for
the failure. The US satellite company demonstrated to the Chinese how to improve the design and reliability of the
guidance system of the LM rockets, which could also be used in developing ballistic missiles. In fact, the cause of the
failure was found independently by Ch
inese scientists. This lay in the quality of the welding of the electronic device in the follow-up frame loop of the rocket
inertia platform. Such a low-level problem has nothing to do with the design and improvement of the rocket.
After the failure launch, the China Great Wall Industry Corp, the major Chinese contractor of international commercial
launching services, released the list of main Chinese astrophysicists who comprised the failure analysis group, failure
investigation committee and failure examination committee. This was later followed by the publication of investigation
procedures and processes. In late February, the Chinese localized the faults on the platform and one month later, they
defined four possible failure modes
_ broken wire of the torque motor of the inner frame, blocking of the inner frame axis, open circuitry of follow-up frame
and stress failure due to poor environment. Then, they made a further careful study, analysis and test of the four
possibilities one by one, gradually ruling out three of them. The semi-hardware-in-large-loop simulation test made in
mid-May led to the final conclusion that the open circuitry of the follow-up frame was the most likely cause of the failure.
The intensive analysis and test
, as well as dissection inspection on various components, conducted between June 17 and July 6, localized the fault,
leading to a conclusion that the root cause of the launch failure was the poor bonding force due to deterioration of the
welding quality of the gold-aluminum bonding point inside the power output module of the follow-up frame's servo-loop,
causing "no current output" from the loop. The slant of the inertial platform, which eventually led to the failure, therefore
During the failure investigation, the Chinese side, under special circumstances and conditions, accepted the IRC
consisting of six experts from the United States, Germany and Britain. At that time, the failure launch of the LM-3B had
seriously affected follow-up contracts, especially the implementation of the Apstar-1A contract. According to common
international practice, commercial satellites can be launched only after both the satellite and the rocket have been insured.
International insurance companies h
ad time and again strongly urged the Chinese side to set up an independent review committee to assess the results of the
failure investigation made by the Chinese side, which was considered the premise for them to insure Apstar-1A.
The IRC announced its founding on April 15 and terminated its mission on May 13. During the 20-odd days, it held only
two meetings _ one from April 22 to 23 in the United States and the other from April 30 to May 1 in Beijing. The actual
work lasted only for four days.
Because the LM-3, not the LM-3B, was responsible for the February 15 failure that would carry Apstar-1A, the
Chinese side explained to the insurance companies and the IRC the differences between the rocket platforms of LM-3B
and LM-3, trying to make it clear that the failure of the LM-3B would not affect the reliability of the launching of
Apstar-1A by the LM-3. Meanwhile, to re-establish the confidence of insurance companies in the rocket, the Chinese
side also released to them and the IRC the periodical i
nvestigation results of the February 15 failure that had been proven by tests. Facing sharp market competition, China
cannot easily give out its rocket manufacturing secrets. During the existence of the IRC, the Chinese side never expected
it to help in the comprehensive investigation and analysis of the failure. Therefore, the Chinese side did not present the
entire failure investigation report to the IRC. Under such circumstances, how could the IRC reveal to the Chinese side
the guidance system design for
the "improvement" of the LM rocket, and what is the basis for such an "improvement?" In fact, the IRC only pointed out
in its appraisal report that "no indication was found which conflicts with the Chinese conclusion," and it did not introduce
any technology to the Chinese side. Even during the existing period of the IRC, the Chinese side had followed its own
plan from the very beginning and actively continued the failure analysis work. It could well be said that the Chinese side
had completely relied on i
ts own effort to find out the final cause and take improvement measures which ensured the following successes of the
The Cox report devotes a lot of space to repeatedly stressing that although the Chinese side confirmed four modes as
the possible cause for the failure at the end of March, it ruled out two modes, including the follow-up frame in April, and
focused its research on the inner frame. It says it was not until the IRC "directed" that the Chinese "abandoned testing of
the inner frame," "started vigorously testing the follower frame," staged the simulation test at the suggestion of the IRC
and finally localized th
e failure to the follow-up frame.
Actually, the follow-up frame had remained the focus of the investigation of Chinese scientists. In early April, the Chinese
experts confirmed its failure based on a series of theoretical analyses. On April 9, they decided to make simulation for
the semi-hardware-in-large-loop of the follow-up frame. From April 16, the Chinese side began to compile the
Simulation Test Guideline (the Semi-Hardware-in-the-Close-Loop Simulation Test Guideline for the Four-Axis Inertial
Platform Failure Mode) and prepare the me
thod and conditions for the test. The Chinese experts designed the mathematical models of launch vehicles,
servo-mechanism and rate gyroscope, drew up the flight software for test purposes, prepared and checked the
simulation test facilities, including the test platform, simulation rotation stand and on-board computer and manufactured
some auxiliary items necessary for the test, such as platform support deck, interface circuit and cable. It took one month
to complete these tasks before the interference of t
he IRC. Because the appraisal of the IRC was derived from the Apstar-1A insurance, and the latter was an episode in
the investigation of China's LM-3B failure, the Chinese side, following the principle of submitting only the results that had
been proven by tests, presented limited materials to the IRC. Consequently, what the IRC learned was only the
periodical result of the failure investigation made by the Chinese side. The claims in the Cox report that the Chinese side
immediately "abandoned" testing of t
he inner frame under the guidance of the IRC do not accord with the facts. It was in mid-May that the Chinese side
cautiously ruled out the inner frame mode based on the simulation test and finally confirmed the follow-up frame mode.
Its failure investigation was carried out in a scientific way, relying entirely on its own effort. The failure diagnosis
procedure adopted by the Chinese side had been proven correct by decades of practice.
The Cox report says: "China Great Wall Industry Corp determined that the root cause of the failure was a deterioration
in the gold-aluminum wiring connections within a power amplifier for the follow-up frame torque motor in the inertial
measurement unit. This was the very problem the Independent Review Committee had identified in their meetings with
PRC officials and in the Preliminary Report." That conforms neither to the facts nor to the basic law of scientific
investigation. The Chinese side's investigat
ion lasted for five months, with a great deal of testing demonstrations. In fact, the confirmation of the cause for such a
specific failure could hardly be made with only limited data material from the preliminary investigation stage, and without
a huge amount of testings. During the IRC's four actual work days, the February 15 failure investigation was still in the
stage of analyzing and verifying the failure mode, and a great deal of testing work of the sub-systems, parts and
components remained to be don
e. How could someone localize the details of the final fault spot up to the component in advance?
The Cox report holds that the investigation of the February 15 failure helped the Chinese side improve its design scheme
of guidance system. In fact, although the LM-3B had a failure in its inertia platform, the main cause was the quality of
component, which had nothing to do with the platform design scheme, to say nothing of an "improvement" of the
guidance system. Thus, how could the conclusion "to improve the design of the guidance system used in the PRC's
newest Long March rocket" be drawn in the Cox re
port? Furthermore, how could the inference that such an improvement was "capable of being adapted for use as the
guidance system for future PRC road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles" be made? How could anyone believe the
Cox report, which has listed so many sensational conclusions according to this kind of logic?
IV. A story with a beginning, but no end
There is no part in the Cox report more ridiculous than Chapter Seven, Launch Site Security in the PRC. Cox and his ilk
believe that the best chance for China to "steal" US satellite technology through commercial launches would be when the
US satellite and related data were delivered to the Chinese launch site. Therefore, they took great pains to collect and
enumerate a large amount of trifle materials and details, trying to prove that China "stole" the US technology. However,
having failed to produce any e
vidence, they were forced to continuously admit that the Select Committee had "found no witness to confirm that a
transfer to the PRC of controlled US technology has occurred as a result of ineffective launch site security." But they
were not willing to give up their preliminary conclusion that China must have stolen US satellite technology. Therefore,
they have to use a lot of conjectural words, such as "if" and "perhaps," to mislead the public.
Since 1990, China has carried out over 20 commercial satellite launches at the Xichang, Taiyuan and Jiuquan launch
sites. Of these, except for the Swedish and Pakistani satellite piggyback launchings at Jiuquan and Xichang and
Sinosat-1 at Xichang, the remaining satellites were all made in the United States. To secure the safety of US-made
satellites, China, as early as December 1988, signed the Memorandum of Agreement on Satellite Technology
Safeguards with the US Government. The memorandum laid down stric
t, almost harsh, requirements for the technology safeguards of US-made satellites to be launched in China. For example:
¨ The Government of the United States of America shall oversee and monitor the implementation of the Technology
Control Plan. Access to all equipment and technical data will be controlled on a 24-hour basis by US persons who have
received training in security procedures from the Government of the United States of America. Such persons shall
control access throughout launch preparations, satellite launch and return of equipment to the United States of America.
¨ The aircraft carrying the spacecraft, equipment and technical data, as well as its cargo, can pass through customs in the
People's Republic of China without inspection and will not be subject to inspection while in the PRC.
¨ Unless specifically permitted by persons authorized by the Government of the United States of America, non-US
persons will not be allowed into the satellite preparation area for any purpose. If non-US persons are allowed into the
satellite preparation area, they must be escorted at all times by US persons.
¨ For access to equipment by non-US persons, a temporary identification badge will be issued, distinctive in colour,
which will be marked "visitor." Issuance of these badges will be controlled by US persons.
Since undertaking commercial satellite launching services, the Chinese side has strictly observed the terms of this
inter-governmental memorandum. Over a period of more than 10 years, the two sides have held about 100 technical
co-ordination meetings. At no time has the US side ever accused the Chinese side of violating the Agreement on Satellite
Technology Safeguards. To secure the implementation of this inter-governmental agreement, delegations authorized by
the Chinese and American governments have held
annual consultations. Over the 10-odd years, the US side has never raised any questions about the technology
safeguards related to the handling of US-made satellites in China. All processes, ranging from the technical co-ordination
meeting before each launch of US-made satellite, the dispatch meeting held every day after the satellite was transported
to the launch site to the contacts between technicians of the two sides, the satellites' entrance into Chinese territory,
satellite testing at the launch site
and the securing of the satellite to the launch vehicle, were all monitored by security officials appointed by the US
Government. Every time the US-made satellite was launched, such security staff accounted for about one-third of the
total number of US satellite working staff in China.
Here are some examples to show the US side's strict control over US-made satellites:
¨ After the US aircraft carrying the satellite(s) arrived at the launch site, it would be overseen by US security personnel.
The unloading of the satellite and other equipment from the aircraft and onto road vehicles was handled by the US side.
On the way from the airport to the launch site, these vehicles were all escorted by US personnel. Even the destruction of
the satellite propellant remains after each launch was overseen by the US security staff.
¨ Before the US satellites entered the satellite test building at the launch site, US security personnel had already checked
the building many times. Even the curtains were changed into the thick, heavy and wind-resistant type required by the US
side. During the whole launch process, all buildings housing US satellites and equipment were guarded by US security
staff and personnel from the Chinese side were forbidden from approaching secured area. Access to such areas by
Chinese personnel should strictly fol
low the requirements cited in the inter-governmental Memorandum of Agreement on Satellite Technology Safeguards,
such as advance approval, registration upon entrance and exit, wearing badges issued by the US side and escorted by
US security personnel.
¨ At the satellite test and filling buildings, control rooms and the operation platform on the launch tower, 18
American-controlled video cameras were installed, conducting 24-hour monitoring of the satellites and test equipment. In
the satellite working area of the test building alone, there were four video cameras pointing at the satellites from different
¨ At each meeting, questions raised or answered by personnel from the US side had to first be approved by US security
officials. For example, to calibrate the electronic weighing equipment of the Xichang Satellite Launch Site, the calibration
weights should have been prepared by the launch site. When the Chinese side asked what exact calibration weights were
needed, the US security officials motioned the US technicians not to answer.
Likewise, since the US side's reinforced monitoring of the US-made satellites would affect the technology safety of
China's re-entry vehicle, the Chinese side had to implement round-the-clock monitoring of its rockets as well.
The Cox report enumerates over 100 "security mistakes during the launch in China," groundlessly assuming that China
"probably" used these mistakes to "steal" US satellite secrets. For example, the fact that "the shower outside the satellite
filling building does not work" was also listed as a "security mistake." In fact, the shower is for personnel who might get
contaminated if there was a satellite fuel leakage during the filling procedure. It has nothing to do with satellite "technical
Even more ridiculous is the claim that "the PRC could accomplish even exploitation that penetrated the interior of the
satellite, given two hours of time, without leaving any traces," and "there is almost nothing about a US satellite that the
PRC could not learn from unrestricted access for 24 hours." It is known to all that a satellite is an extremely large,
complicated and precise high-tech product. It is composed of tens of thousands of components, thousands of parts and
dozens of branch systems, coverin
g knowledge of many subjects. How can it be mastered within a few hours? Just as the old saying goes: If you are out to
condemn somebody, you can always trump up a charge.
Mr A.D. Coates, an occasional US Government-appointed security official for US-made satellite launches, told the
Chinese side after the Aussat-B1 launch failure on March 22, 1992, that: "As a security official of the Government of the
United States, I can say in a responsible way that the Chinese side has completely observed the Technology Safeguards
Agreement between the two governments on the American-made satellites launched from Chinese territory. In the
technical co-ordination meetings in the three yea
rs since the Aussat contract was signed, and the joint operation in this campaign, no unauthorized technology transfer has
occurred. I am well satisfied with the co-operation between China and the United States, and appreciate all your
collaboration." US Defence Technology Security Administration Director Tarbell admitted that he was not aware of any
evidence that this access resulted in a technology transfer that would significantly affect US national security.
Re:Re:Cox report_a complete fabrication (Full text of the SC report Part III)
Re : Re:Cox report_a complete fabrication (Full text of the SC report Part II) -- xxn
China and the United States have developed scientific and technological exchanges and economic and trade
co-operation on the basis of equality and mutual benefits. This conforms to the interests of the people in both countries
as well as the trend of historical development. It is currently normal for countries to conduct such exchanges and
co-operation. Yet, even these activities have been subjected to deliberate distortion in the Cox report.
On January 31, 1979, China and the United States signed an inter-governmental agreement on scientific and
technological co-operation. The efforts made by the two countries over the past two decades have enabled this
co-operation to reach a considerable scale. Until now, co-operative protocols signed by related departments of the two
countries have covered 33 fields, including education, agriculture, space, atmosphere, ocean fishing, medicine, health,
earthquake prediction, environmental protection, water re
sources, energy efficiency and renewable energy.
In the agricultural sector, the two sides have exchanged a great deal of seed resources. The Chinese side has provided
the US side with more than 2,000 crop species, including many precious wild species. In the health sector, important
medical statistics and data have been exchanged. The Chinese side has provided the US side with the investigation
results about cancer distribution among 240 million Chinese people across the country and the Cancer Distribution Map
in China, compiled on the basis of cancer oc
currence rate, death rate and regional distribution, which proved to be of great significance for the United States to make
comparative studies and find ways to prevent and control the disease. The network of seismic stations, jointly established
by the two countries, enables the United States to obtain 150,000 pieces of microfiche recording and other data from
China, which are of great value to studies on the causes and formation of earthquakes and to the improvement of
forecasting techniques. Lies in the
Cox report have not only hurt the feeling of scientists of the two countries, but also affected normal bilateral scientific and
technological exchanges and co-operation.
What is most malicious about the Cox report is that it links China's policies and guidelines for developing science and
technology, the research institutes and their staff engaging in bilateral scientific and technological exchanges, the business
agencies and their staff engaging in economic and trade exchanges, the official and non-official Chinese representative
offices and their staff in the United States, American Chinese and Chinese students in the United States with the
so-called espionage activities.
This is typical racial discrimination and a deadly insult to the Chinese nation. It marks the reappearance of McCarthyism,
active in the United States during the 1950s, and reflects the aberrant personality of some US politicians hostile to
China's development and becoming powerful.
The "863 Programme" is an open and normal medium to-long-term scientific research and development plan launched by
the Chinese Government in 1986. It is a strategic policy decision made by the nation to use its own intellectual, financial
and material resources to independently develop science and technology in order to narrow the gap with foreign
advanced scientific and technical level and accelerate its own national economic development. But, in the Cox report,
this programme is groundlessly associated wi
th the "theft" of US technology and sensitive military technology in particular. Never did China in the past, nor does it at
present or will it in the future, develop its science and technology on the basis of so-called "theft."
Compared with the high-tech development programmes of other countries, China's "863 Programme" has the following
First, as a high-tech plan of a developing country, it sets limited areas and goals which centre on the economic
development and improvement of the people's living standards.
Second, under the circumstances of a comparatively weak high-tech foundation, the plan aims at learning useful
international experience and advanced technology through normal channels conforming to common international
practices. The "863 Programme" mainly involves the science and technology related to the development of the national
economy and overall national strength. For instance, the 13 key technological development projects and the eight major
achievements transfer projects outlined in the "863 Progr
amme" during the eighth five-year plan period (1991-95) were: (1) Key technologies: two-line hybrid rice, insect
pest-resistant transgenic cotton and other transgenic plants, gene therapy for malignant tumors and other diseases, large
scale parallel computing, optical fiber amplifier and pump, infra-red adaptive optics observation system for 2.16-metre
telescope, 2.48 GB/S SDH high speed optical fiber transmission system, airborne real-time remote sensing imaging
transmitting and processing system, STEP-bas
ed CAD/CAPP/CAM system, 6,000-metre autonomous underwater vehicle, high-temperature gas-cooled reactor,
double-layer glow plasma surface alloying technology and research of the diamond film; and (2) Major achievements
transfer projects: genetic engineering polypeptide drugs, two-line hybrid rice demonstration, new era computers,
high-powered laser and its applications, enterprises' CIMS application demonstration, robotic automation demonstration
engineering, high-performance low-sintering temperature multi-
layer ceramics capacitor, nickel-metal hydride batteries and related materials.
The Cox report intentionally distorts the research projects included in the "863 Programme." For instance, the gene
research plan, which was clearly designed for the development of new medicines, "could have biological warfare
application." The plan for developing a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor by Qinghua University is a basic research
project for the development of the civilian use of nuclear energy, but it is said to "aid in the development of nuclear
weapons." This can only show people how skille
d Cox and others are at fabricating lies.
The Cox report also says that China's ''appetite for information and technology appears to be insatiable, and the energy
devoted to the task enormous." This is a malicious calumny. Not only does it have no evidence to support this conclusion
throughout the nearly 900 pages, but, on the contrary, it shows that the fabricators of the Cox report are insatiably
avaricious for and have devoted great energy to getting hold of China's military technology and information. Anyone
reading the Cox report will gain suc
h an understanding that none of the so-called materials substantially listed in the report from beginning to end provides
absolute proof and specific facts adequately enough to verify its conclusions. Instead, the report gives a systematic
description of China's nuclear weapons, various guided missiles, satellites and military aircraft and vessels, showing the
performance indices and structural sketch maps of some of them, and even giving the details of research and
development process in some cases. The sp
ecific models of "Chinese military equipment" mentioned in the Cox report include enhanced radiation weapons (neutron
bomb); eight kinds of ballistic missiles ranging from CSS-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 to CSS-52; DF-31 intercontinental missiles;
JL-1 and JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles; C801 and C802 anti-ship cruise missiles; YH-4 cruise missile; K-8
military aircraft; F-10 fighter; H-11 military helicopter; airborne warning aircraft; FSW, FSW-1 and FSW-2
photo-reconnaissance satellites; 094 submarine
and Xia (summer) class ballistic missile nuclear-powered submarine. The report also makes irresponsible comments on
China's future development programs concerning guided missiles, nuclear weapons and manned space flight. Here, we
do not want to say anything about the so-called "military equipment" and development programme listed in the Cox
report. But this is quite sufficient to show that Cox and others are hankering after the military secrets of another country.
It is a case of a thief crying "Stop thief
VI. Absurd logic
China is a developing country. Due to its limited financial capacity, it has to buy some commercially worthwhile
second-hand equipment with less advanced technological level but at a low price. However, such normal commercial
activities were regarded by Cox and others as China's "theft" of technology from the United States. Chapter 10 of the
Cox report describes at great length how the China National Aero-Technology Import-Export Corp (CATIC)
purchased second-hand equipment from the US McDonnell Douglas Cor
p in 1994, giving enormous publicity to these normal commercial activities. It also links these pure commercial activities
with US national security, which is totally unreasonable.
In fact, in February 1994, CATIC and McDonnell Douglas signed a second-hand equipment purchase contract to the
effect of importing over 200 sets of machining equipment and instruments. China bought the second-hand equipment
totally out of a commercial consideration. They had all been used for years and could no longer be considered advanced.
Of the 200-odd pieces of equipment, 19 needed a US Government export licence. In advance of the import, the
Chinese Government provided the Importer Statement on End-Us
er and End-Use for 18 of the items at the request of the US side, and the Chinese user filled out the enterprise guarantee
on the spot for the remaining one. Table 2 illustrates in detail the year the 19 pieces of equipment were made and their
The table shows that though all the items needed the US Government export licence, they had run for many years and
most of the spare parts had been worn-out and their precision had declined. In order to be put into operation, a large
number of parts had to be replaced. Because the 19 sets of equipment were second-hand, the price was only 25 to 30
per cent of the cost of new ones.
The Cox report says China purchased these machine tools for the purpose of manufacturing military equipment. This is
ridiculous. In fact, China purchased the equipment for use in the trunk airliner programme in consultation with McDonnell
Douglas and for the contracted plane parts programme in consultation with both McDonnell Douglas and Boeing. For
this purpose, CATIC planned to set up a machine-oriented joint venture with the Monitor Corp of the United States, but
the plan was dropped for commercial reaso
ns. Four of the most advanced 5A3P (5-axis and 3-spindle) gantry profilers among the 19 items that had acquired US
Government export licenses were not shipped back to China and were leased to the Monitor Corp on site. If China
intended to divert the equipment to the military use, it would have surely arranged to get the four most advanced pieces
of equipment rather than leasing them to Monitor. This shows that Chinese users imported this batch of equipment purely
for commercial profit.
The Cox report seizes upon the fact that the Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Co opened the hydraulic stretch press
package of the 19 sets of equipment ahead of time, trying to prove that China imported the equipment for military
purpose. In fact, the hydraulic stretch press was also second-hand equipment made in 1983 and the technology used is
not advanced. China could purchase and has already purchased new and more advanced machine tools with similar
properties in the international market.
VII. Thought running counter to historical trend
One of the most striking achievements in modern scientific and technological progress is the development and application
of the computer. It has played an important role in the development of the global economy and the progress of human
civilization. Today, computers have been more and more closely related with people's daily lives and widely used in all
fields of economic and social life. Now, computers can be found everywhere _ in teaching and scientific research,
commercial activities, outdoor tours, dai
ly life, medical service, health care, banking and financial management as well as in weather forecasting, transportation
and communications. Cox and others, however, intentionally over-emphasize the use of computers in the military field.
They look on the development and application of computers as a tool threatening and even destroying mankind rather
than as a factor benefiting mankind, and devote enormous coverage to the negative aspects. Cox and others propose to
strengthen the control over the export o
f computers to other countries. This is an action running totally counter to the historical trend.
The Cox report alleges that the main purpose of China's development and application of advanced computers is to apply
them in the military field, and that China has used illegal means to "acquire" US computer technology. This does not tally
with the facts in any way.
Similar to other countries in the world, China develops and uses computers for the purpose of accelerating the
development of the national economy, improving the people's living standards and making daily life more convenient.
China has imported many computers, including high performance ones, along with spare parts from the United States. In
1995, for example, the China Meteorological Centre imported the CRAY/c-92, a high performance computer, from the
US-based Cray Co, for analyzing and processing meteorological data. How does weather forecast, a work beneficial to
all of mankind, menace the US security?
China imports computers from the United States through normal commercial channels in accordance with business rules
commonly practised in the world, which also has brought enormous commercial benefits to the United States, and
created many employment opportunities for it. China has always believed that, in the field of computer exports, the
control policy of the United States runs against the historical tide, creating man-made barriers for the healthy
development of bilateral economic and trade relations an
d harming the trade balance between the two countries.
The so-called high performance computers mentioned in the Cox report refer to those with a speed of 2000 MTOPS
(million theoretical operations per second). But China had long been able to make computers operating at a much higher
speed. The operation speed of computers China makes now far exceeds 2000 MTOPS.
Although the United States has imposed all sorts of restrictions on computer exports, China has never ventured to
"acquire" US computer technologies through abnormal channels. In order to apply for a US computer export licence, the
Chinese Government, at the request of the US side, provided the Importer's Statement on End-User and End-Use,
making an end-user and end-use commitment. In order to maintain the credit of the Chinese Government and exercise
effective management over the work related to the Import
er's Statement on End-User and End-Use, responsible government departments have issued a series of specific and
effective rules and regulations, stipulating that commodities imported after going through the formality of the Importer
Statement on End-User and End-Use can only be used for the purpose designated in the statement and that, without the
permission from the original exporting nation, the commodities are not allowed to be exported to a third country. Years
of practice have proven that the Chinese G
overnment has exercised serious and effective management over the work.
Examining the end-user of computers is not a common international practice. However, in order to promote the
development of Sino-US economic and trade relations, the Chinese side made utmost efforts in this respect, reaching an
understanding with the US side in June 1998. Within six months after the understanding was reached, the US side made
requests for seven visits to China. China tried its best to accommodate the requests and has, in fact, arranged six visits.
This shows the sincerity of the Chinese sid
e, and the US side has never challenged this aspect. The Cox report, however, turns a blind eye to this and, furthermore,
accuses China of breaking its promises, which is not true.
VIII. Criticism of the Cox report from the media and experts worldwide
Since it was released, the Cox report has been criticized by the media as well as experts and scholars in some countries,
including the United States, for its elements of fantasy and absurdity.
The New York Times of the United States said on May 25 that the facts stressed in the Cox report were too fantastic
and complicated. The conclusion of the report was arbitrary. Without hard answers and without a suspect under arrest,
the case is like a thriller missing its final pages, it said.
Suddeutsche Zeitung, a German newspaper, said on May 25 that the Cox report asked more questions than it answered
and had more accusations than explanations.
Mainichi Shimbun of Japan said on May 28 that the Cox report did not provide any conclusive proof of China's "theft" of
technologies. Instead, it mostly used such vague terms as "probably" or "seemingly."
Lyndon H. LaRouche, founder of the Executive Intelligence Review, said in a statement published on June 2 that the Cox
report was a fraud. Its accusation of the so-called Chinese "theft of nuclear secrets" was sheer fabrication. The fraud of
the Cox report is "a reflection of the kind of scientific illiteracy" of its writers. LaRouche said that the so-called "nuclear
secrets" were easily obtainable from the Internet, but the Cox committee spent a great sum of money in investigating
these false charges, whic
h was simply "too ridiculous." LaRouche went on to point out that the clear purpose of the Cox committee was to
undermine US-China relations.
The ABC News of the United States said in a story headlined Errors Mar Cox Report that there are many amazing de
facto mistakes. Mistakes range from substantial misrepresentation of Chinese aerospace technology to minor errors in
dates and hardware designations. This makes people wonder how credible the Cox report is. Are these erroneous facts
the basis for the report's conclusion?
Joseph Cirincione, expert with the US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the Cox report "lacks basic
support" and "is purely a propaganda work." It was the "least convincing" investigation report he had ever seen. He
thought the report required the US Government to tighten up supervision and administration over the export of sensitive
technologies and equipment, such as satellites and super computers, to China. This could be very difficult to operate as it
would arouse complaints from commerci
al interest groups.
Frankfurter Fundschau, a German newspaper, said on May 25 that many US politicians "are now keenly looking for a
new evil empire." Delivering such a report aims at attacking the existing China policy of the United States instead of
finding the truth.
Hong Kong Standard said on May 30 that what the Americans were shouting at and flailing against was merely their
hallucination of China's shadow. It said that there were not many people in the West, and even less in the East, who
treated the Cox report seriously. It stated that the Cox report lashed out at the US Government's China policy but
directed its target of attack to China.
The Los Angeles Times reported on May 30 that Robert Norris, a military expert, had sharply criticized the Cox report.
He thought the impression created by the report was that each of China's weaponry achievements was gained by
espionage, instead of from scientific and technical journals or academic conferences. In fact, large quantities of technical
information can be gained from openly published publications in China or anywhere else. Scientific secrets are not
absolute, and are not the property of any co
untry, he said.
The Cox report, running to nearly 900 pages, lists data, which is either intentionally fabricated or painstakingly distorted.
Although it can whip up public opinion and hoodwink some people for a while, it cannot do so for long. For a period of
time, some politicians in the United States have clung on to the outdated Cold War mentality and made an issue out of
Sino-US relations by stirring up an anti-China mood to reap political profit. Years of practice have proved that the
healthy development of Sino-US r
elations coincide with the fundamental interests of the peoples of the two countries. Some US politicians try hard to
undermine Sino-US relations by fabricating lies, which is really dishonorable. But, it is impossible for them to succeed.
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